El presente trabajo intenta mostrar de qué manera Plotino refuta la noción aristotélica del tiempo como «número» o «medida del movimiento», cuáles son las aporías que plantea, cómo las compulsa con sus propios argumentos y qué soluciones propone con respecto a esa misma confrontación. Todo esto será encauzado a partir de un estudio descriptivo y analítico, acompañado de una lectura a la vez hermenéutica y crítica de los textos seleccionados para esta ocasión.

Desde el punto de vista no solo historiográfico sino también _topológico_, atendiendo a la hermenéutica textual que se desprende de las _Enéadas_, este trabajo pretende mostrar que el pensamiento de Plotino representa la primera respuesta racionalmente satisfactoria a la irrupción histórica sin precedentes del principio de la _diferencia absoluta_, establecido ya en el _Evangelio según San Juan_. La trascendencia del Uno-Bien evidencia otro ámbito histórico y filosófico que no pertenece ya al modo griego de comprender la naturaleza metafísica de la (...) verdad. En Plotino, la verdad cobra la forma de una _operatio_, pues ella infunde en el alma un amor que la mueve hacia la unión infinita. Esta noción de la verdad se aproxima más a las contribuciones posteriores a Plotino y constituye, por ende, un punto de partida solvente para la reflexión teológica ulterior sobre la trascendencia divina y la dependencia causal del ente en el orden del ser. Para el logro de los fines propuestos, se utiliza un registro descriptivo y analítico, junto con una lectura crítica tanto de las fuentes como de la bibliografía especializada. (shrink)

El presente trabajo intenta mostrar el modo en que Tomás de Aquino tematiza el vicio de la acedia como taedium operandi en la Summa Theologiae II-II, q. 35. Para ello, se procederá en la recuperación, y consecuente análisis, de los elementos tanto sistemáticos cuanto doctrinales sobre cuya base el Aquinate desarrolla esta temática.

La conceptualización y el marco legal del odio en las democracias contemporáneas están en el centro de la atención por su proximidad al problema de la libertad de expresión. La reciente migración del discurso público de ambientes desconectados a escenarios en línea nos obliga a adoptar enfoques más penetrantes en esta cuestión, para entender cómo las dinámicas de género se reproducen entre los usuarios de internet. El artículo ofrece una aproximación legal, desde una perspectiva de género, al odio tal y (...) como aparece en la legislación internacional y europea, con el fin de comparar las legislaciones de Italia y España. El objetivo es mediar el conflicto entre libertad de expresión y los compromisos que los Estados asumen para dotar a específicos sujetos de protección contra formas de violencia de género que ocurren en internet. (shrink)

Monetary intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the dark side of monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics—dishonesty. Dishonesty, a risky prospect, involves cost–benefit analysis of self-interest. We frame good or bad barrels in the environmental context as a proxy of high or low probability of getting caught for dishonesty, respectively. We theorize: The magnitude and intensity of (...) the relationship between love of money and dishonest prospect may reveal how individuals frame dishonesty in the context of two levels of subjective norm—perceived corporate ethical values at the micro-level and Corruption Perceptions Index at the macro-level, collected from multiple sources. Based on 6382 managers in 31 geopolitical entities across six continents, our cross-level three-way interaction effect illustrates: As expected, managers in good barrels, mixed barrels, and bad barrels display low, medium, and high magnitude of dishonesty, respectively. With high CEV, the intensity is the same across cultures. With low CEV, the intensity of dishonesty is the highest in high CPI entities —the Enron Effect, but the lowest in low CPI entities. CPI has a strong impact on the magnitude of dishonesty, whereas CEV has a strong impact on the intensity of dishonesty. We demonstrate dishonesty in light of monetary values and two frames of social norm, revealing critical implications to the field of behavioral economics and business ethics. (shrink)

Monetary Intelligence theory asserts that individuals apply their money attitude to frame critical concerns in the context and strategically select certain options to achieve financial goals and ultimate happiness. This study explores the bright side of Monetary Intelligence and behavioral economics, frames money attitude in the context of pay and life satisfaction, and controls money at the macro-level and micro-level. We theorize: Managers with low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior will have high subjective well-being: pay satisfaction and (...) quality of life. Data collected from 6586 managers in 32 cultures across six continents support our theory. Interestingly, GDP per capita is related to life satisfaction, but not to pay satisfaction. Individual income is related to both life and pay satisfaction. Neither GDP nor income is related to Happiness. Our theoretical model across three GDP groups offers new discoveries: In high GDP entities, “high income” not only reduces aspirations—“Rich, Motivator, and Power,” but also promotes stewardship behavior—“Budget, Give/Donate, and Contribute” and appreciation of “Achievement.” After controlling income, we demonstrate the bright side of Monetary Intelligence: Low love of money motive but high stewardship behavior define Monetary Intelligence. “Good apples enjoy good quality of life in good barrels.” This notion adds another explanation to managers’ low magnitude of dishonesty in entities with high Corruption Perceptions Index. In low GDP entities, high income is related to poor Budgeting skills and escalated Happiness. These managers experience equal satisfaction with pay and life. We add a new vocabulary to the conversation of monetary intelligence, income, GDP, happiness, subjective well-being, good and bad apples and barrels, corruption, and behavioral ethics. (shrink)

Corruption involves greed, money, and risky decision-making. We explore the love of money, pay satisfaction, probability of risk, and dishonesty across cultures. Avaricious monetary aspiration breeds unethicality. Prospect theory frames decisions in the gains-losses domain and high-low probability. Pay dissatisfaction (in the losses domain) incites dishonesty in the name of justice at the individual level. The Corruption Perceptions Index, CPI, signals a high-low probability of getting caught for dishonesty at the country level. We theorize that decision-makers adopt avaricious love-of-money aspiration (...) as a lens and frame dishonesty in the gains-losses domain (pay satisfaction-dissatisfaction, Level 1) and high-low probability (CPI, Level 2) to maximize expected utility and ultimate serenity. We challenge the myth: Pay satisfaction mitigates dishonesty across nations consistently. Based on 6500 managers in 32 countries, our cross-level three-dimensional visualization offers the following discoveries. Under high aspiration conditions, pay dissatisfaction excites the highest- (third-highest) avaricious justice-seeking dishonesty in high (medium) CPI nations, supporting the certainty effect. However, pay satisfaction provokes the second-highest avaricious opportunity-seizing dishonesty in low CPI entities, sustaining the possibility effect—maximizing expected utility. Under low aspiration conditions, high pay satisfaction consistently leads to low dishonesty, demonstrating risk aversion—achieving ultimate serenity. We expand prospect theory from a micro and individual-level theory to a cross-level theory of monetary wisdom across 32 nations. We enhance the S-shaped Curve to three 3-D corruption surfaces across three levels of the global economic pyramid, providing novel insights into behavioral economics, business ethics, the environment, and responsibility. (shrink)

A partir de las críticas que el igualitarismo fraternal lanzó contra el igualitarismo de la suerte, G. A. Cohen propuso un compromiso a través del denominado modelo de campamento. Puesto que dicho trade-off no quedó formalizado, en este artículo se intenta aportar algunos elementos en tal dirección. En concreto, se argumenta: a) que Cohen tiende un primer puente hacia el igualitarismo fraternal al distinguir los aspectos de equidad y legitimidad en una concepción de lo justo, conjuntamente con la afirmación de (...) que la suerte en las opciones nunca preserva la justicia; b) que los principios igualitario y comunitario, que Cohen postula como deseables para el socialismo, operan sobre la base de la distinción equidad-legitimidad, de modo que las desigualdades generadas por elecciones genuinas y mala suerte en las opciones son justas en tanto resultan legítimas pero no son justas en términos de equidad y, en consecuencia, las desigualdades que rasgan el tejido social son causalmente fundamentales mientras que el principio comunitario es normativamente fundamental; y c) que los elementos comunitarios que impulsan el compromiso de Cohen ya están presentes en sus nociones de igualdad voluntaria, ethos igualitario, lectura estricta del Principio de Diferencia rawlsiano y comunidad justificatoria. (shrink)

We present a category-theoretical analysis, based on the concept of generic figures, of a diagrammatic system for propositional logic (Peirce’s Existential Graphs α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\alpha $$\end{document}). The straightforward construction of a presheaf category EGα∗\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {E}}}{{\mathcal {G}}}_{\alpha ^{*}}$$\end{document} of cuts-only Existential Graphs (equivalent to the well-studied category of finite forests) provides a basis for the further construction of the category EGα\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} (...) \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${{\mathcal {E}}}{{\mathcal {G}}}_\alpha $$\end{document} which introduces variables in a reconstructedly generic, or label-free, mode. Morphisms in these categories represent syntactical embeddings or, equivalently but dually, extensions. Through the example of Peirce’s system, it is shown how the generic figures approach facilitates the formal investigation of relations between syntax and semantics in such diagrammatic systems. (shrink)

The main task of a critical theory of medicine should be to develop a perspectival, context-fair, and multidimensional science of actions which integrates both diversity and heterogeneity within medicine without eliminating either one. Such a theory should employ diversity in the following areas: (1) in systems, subsystems, and professions, because different medical professions embody different health-care subsystems, thereby influencing the way manpower is utilized, (2) in actors, (e.g., patients, health-care experts, and society), processes, and situations, because each actor potentially conceptualizes (...) health, illness, and desired outcomes differently; and (3) in models of medicine (i.e., as an object science versus an action science). Situational influences modify concepts and explanatory models; even the particular terms, such as illness, disease, and sickness, are not necessarily concordant with each other. (shrink)

The sociological work of Elias is studied, together with his characteristic outcast position, typical of judaism at the end of the century. From such judaic root stems the metapolitical approach observed in the process of civilization from the platform of a Human Genre already assume as formed and defined by the civilized conscience. The idea of a metapolitical (extraterritorial) platform is determined, and its possible historical and political efficiency. Finally, the work focuses on the limits of the civilization process, contrasting (...) N. Elias and G. Bueno conceptions on the issue. Hence a third alternative which observs such limit of history and its superation in the “antropological field” – through the a structural, technoscientific and objective development of society – springs as a source from where the “ultramoderne spirit” described at the end of the issue finds its origins. (shrink)

The article discusses the rights of minorities in the system of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It establishes a conceptual distinction between universal rights, specific rights of minorities in general and specific rights of particular minorities. Universal rights correspond to all individuals (e,g,, “no one shall be subjected to torture”) or all groups of a certain class (e.g., “all families are entitled to protection”). Minority groups and their members are entitled to these rights in the same way (...) as any other individual or group. Specific rights of minorities in general are granted to minority groups (e.g., “minority groups have the right to speak their own language”) or their members (e.g., “persons belonging to a minority group have the right to speak the language of the group”). Finally, specific rights of particular minorities are granted to specific groups identified by their characteristics (e.g., “the linguistic minority X has the right to speak the X language”) or their members (e.g., “any member of the linguistic minority X has the right to speak the X language”). Treaties and international declarations often refer to universal rights and specific rights of minorities in general. However, these rights are usually recognised in broad terms, and their implementation may lead to the recognition of specific rights in favour of particular minorities or their members. Protection of minorities (in the broad sense of the expression) is based on two pillars: on the one hand, the protection against discrimination; on the other hand, the protection of minorities in the strict sense. The first pillar is an aspect of the general principle of nondiscrimination and requires respect for both formal and substantive equalities. The protection of minorities in the strict sense involves the preservation of their particular identity. The purpose of the equality in a formal sense is achieved through universal rights, to the extent that these are granted to minority groups and their members. On the contrary, to achieve equality in a substantive sense, it could be necessary to implement positive measures. The implementation of these measures will usually lead to the recognition of specific rights of minority groups or their members. Finally, the protection of the distinctive characteristics of the minorities will also be done through specific rights. Thus, on the one hand, there are rights, which are intended to protect the minority forms of life (i.e. to protect differences), and, on the other hand, those that are intended to allow minorities equal access to different uniform social goods (i.e. to protect equality). Whereas the former ones seek to protect and promote the particularities of the minority culture (e.g., the right to receive education in their own language), the latter ones are recognised to overcome the disadvantages that minority groups and their members face and are not intended to promote peculiarities, but rather to permit equal access to resources and social opportunities. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights enshrines specific rights of minorities intended to protect and promote their own forms of life. Although economic rights are not mentioned (the article refers to the rights “to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, [and] to use their own language”), they may stem from the explicitly recognised rights. The rights recognised by the Covenant are not collective, but individual rights (“in those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right [...]”). The rights recognised in the Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities are of the same nature. The principle of equality and non-discrimination is contained in Articles 2.1 and 26 of the Covenant. This principle forbids direct and indirect discrimination, be it de iure or de facto. As this is a universal right, minorities can also benefit from it. According to the Human Rights Committee, Article 27 imposes on States the adoption of positive measures that exceed an attitude of mere abstention. In the same way, positive measures may be necessary to make the principle of equality and non-discrimination effective. Although neither Article 27 nor Articles 2.1 and 26 refer to individuals belonging to a specific minority, the concrete implementation of these articles through positive measures may produce specific rights for persons belonging to particular minority groups. (shrink)

O presente texto, de que se dá em seguida a tradução portuguesa, consiste numa selecção da correspondência entre F. W. J Schelling, J. C. F. Hölderlin e G. W. F. Hegel, três colegas e amigos do Stift de Tübingen, três vértices de uma das mais interessantes e importantes unidades teóricas do idealismo alemão e, por conseguinte, três elementos cujos anos de aprendizagem filosófica se revelam hoje essenciais para a boa compreensão da génese da sua época.

RESUMO: Fruto de longa maturação filosófica desde a sua estada em Jena, e instado a isso pelas influências de Karl L. Reinhold e Johann G. Fichte, o poeta Novalis produz, a partir do outono de 1795, um conjunto de anotações fragmentárias sobre a filosofia de Fichte, hoje conhecidas como Fichte-Studien. De entre os importantes temas aí abordados, um revela-se particularmente interessante: o tema do estatuto da Filosofia no seio do problema da autocompreensão do Eu -, e mais concretamente, o necessário (...) pensar da filosofia sobre si própria, as alterações que no processo têm de sobrevir à própria filosofia e a repercussão disto na compreensão de si próprio do Eu. Nesta senda, o seguinte ensaio propõe-se mostrar como, para Novalis, a filosofia é o natural pensar do homem, e como para além disto é a própria filosofia, com o decorrer do seu pensamento sobre si própria, que molda o curso da compreensão de si próprio do Eu: quer tendo com o Eu uma origem comum, nascendo com ele, lançando-o para o mundo e cindindo a união originária em que ele de outro modo sempre estaria, quer, por fim, afirmando-se como carência deste, ou como algo por que o Eu e a própria filosofia têm de passar no seu curso, para que possam experienciar a perda, e almejar à recuperação dessa origem. ABSTRACT: Fruit of a long philosophical maturation that began with his stay in Jena, and encouraged by the influence of Karl L. Reinhold and Johann G. Fichte, the poet Novalis produced, from autumn 1795 on, a set of fragmentary notes on the philosophy of Fichte. These are now known as Fichte-Studien. Among the important issues treated in the notes, one appears particularly interesting: the treatment of the theme of philosophy within the problem of the self-understanding of the "I" - and, more specifically, the need for philosophy to think about itself, about the changes that must come upon philosophy during this process, and about the impact of these on the self-understanding of the "I". The present article aims to show how, for Novalis, philosophy is the natural thought of man. Furthermore, it aims to show how philosophy, in the course of its thought on itself, shapes the course of the self-understanding of the "I", having with the "I" a common origin, being born with it, launching it into the world, cleaving the original union in which it otherwise would always be, and finally asserting itself as a lack of this union, something through which the "I" and philosophy itself must pass in their course so they can experience this loss and aim to recover its source. (shrink)

Este artículo reseña: Francisco Javier ANSUÁTEGUI ROIG, Norme, giudici, Stato costituzionale. Frammenti di un modelo giuridico, G. Giappichelli Editore, Torino, 2020, 221 pp.

RESUMO O presente ensaio aborda o período anterior às obras tidas como as diferentes reescrições da Doutrina da Ciência, de J. G. Fichte, e aí tenta não só perceber a origem da necessidade de um princípio da identidade, como ela surge aquando das primeiras ocorrências do mesmo, mas também discernir os primeiros passos de todo o problema da possibilidade de um princípio absoluto de toda a filosofia, que sempre animaria a empresa. O foco em questão é a «Aenesidemus-Rezension», onde Fichte (...) junta a sua voz ao aceso diálogo já anteriormente entabulado por K. L. Reinhold e G. E. Schulze, e, na necessidade de repensar o princípio da consciência do primeiro, e as críticas a este feitas pelo segundo, é trazido à convicção da necessidade de um novo princípio absoluto; mas onde, e é este o fulcro do presente ensaio, Fichte percebe a insuficiência filososófica do sistema reinholdiano como uma insuficiência de linguagem, e portanto todo o problema como um problema que depende intimamente de uma apoditicidade linguística, e daí parte para a proposta de uma nova terminologia nacional, uma linguagem filosófica sistematicamente certa e inequívoca, à altura de um sistema filosófico regido por um princípio absoluto – um problema que viria a ocupar as cogitações de toda a geração de jovens pensadores em torno do professor de Jena. ABSTRACT This essay approaches the period prior to the works considered as the different versions of the Doctrine of Science, by J. G. Fichte, and aims not only at discerning the origin of the need for a principle of identity, but also at retracing the first steps of the whole problem of the possibility of an absolute principle of all philosophy. The focus shall be the «Aenesidemus-Rezension», where Fichte joins his voice to the heated argument previously struck by K. L. Reinhold and G. E. Schulze, and, urged to rethink Reinhold's principle of consciousness and the criticism raised by Schulze, is brought to believe the necessity for a new absolute principle; but where, and this is the fundamental idea of this essay, Fichte realizes the philosophical insufficiency of Reinhold's system as a language-related insufficiency, and therefore the whole problem as one intimately dependent on a linguistic apodicticity, and moves on to propose a new national terminology, a systematically certain and unequivocal philosophical language, which might meet the demands of a philosophical system ruled by an absolute principle – a problem which would soon be in the agenda of a whole generation of young idealists around the Professor of Jena. (shrink)

Resumo: O presente ensaio visa debruçar-se sobre o conjunto de anotações coligidas por Immanuel Kant, tendo em vista a arguição da dissertação do seu colega J. G. Kreutzfeld. Mais concretamente, pretende-se analisar a visão kantiana do tópico da ilusão poética, e o vínculo que esta forja entre as inferiores e as superiores faculdades do ânimo, a sensibilidade e o entendimento. Almeja-se ainda demonstrar como, para Kant, o engano apenas suscita o fastídio do espírito e, portanto, nenhum conhecimento ou prazer, ao (...) passo que a ilusão poética promove a ficcionação dos dados da sensibilidade e respectiva promoção da tarefa do entendimento na apreciação destes, e concluir como isso mesmo é para o filósofo um jogo que a ilusão enceta com o espírito, e do qual este extrai não só prazer, como também o avanço no seu conhecimento de si e do mundo. Por fim, esse mesmo jogo será apresentado por Kant como o sustentáculo principal para uma muito singular, mas sobretudo muito profícua cooperação entre poesia e filosofia.: The following essay discusses Immanuel Kant’s “Entwurf zu einer Opponenten-Rede”, which treats of his colleague J. G. Kreutzfeld’s dissertation. More specifically, my aim is to analyze Kant’s view of poetical illusion, and the bond it forges between the inferior and the superior faculties of the spirit, that is, the sensibility and the understanding. I also aim at demonstrating how, for Kant, deceit only arouses aversion, and therefore no knowledge or pleasure whatsoever; poetical illusion, on the other hand, promotes the fictionalization of the data of sensibility and enhances the role of the understanding in judging them. For Kant this is a game which the illusion plays with the spirit, and from whence the latter derives not only pleasure but also an advancement in its cognition of itself and the world. Finally, this very game is presented by Kant as the main foundation of a very singular, but above all very fertile, cooperation between poetry and philosophy. (shrink)

This course aims to assess the principle of compositionality (CP) and how it fits with recent developments in natural language interpretation, especially those that stress the role of context. We first try to lay down a suitable formal framework for CP, reviewing proposals by Montague, Janssen, Hendriks, Kracht and Hodges. Versions of CP of varying strength are formulated, and some recent results on the existence of compositional semantics and the (much debated) issue of the empirical import of CP discussed. Complementing (...) CP is the notion of context which, under modern (e.g. "dynamic") conceptions, not only conditions interpretation but also is transformed during interpretation. The tension between CP and context is examined relative to problems of anaphora, presupposition, idioms and ambiguity. A somewhat un-orthodox computational application of CP is suggested, emphasizing co-inductive aspects of interpretation that cut across the divide between model-theoretic and proof-theoretic approaches, and between procedural and declarative styles. (shrink)

Schubert’s proposal ([Sch00]) that sentences not only describe but also characterize situations is worked out in the context of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), a well-known propositional logic with linear future operators (e.g. [HR04]). The resulting formalism LTL∗∗ illustrates an approach that diverges from Schubert’s FOL∗∗ in technical details but shares many (if not all) its motivations.

Suppose an inquiring group wants to let a certain view stand as the group's view. But there’s a problem: the individuals in that group do not initially all agree with one another about what the correct view is. What should the group do, given that it wants to settle on a single answer, in the face of this kind of intragroup disagreement? Should the group members deliberate and exchange evidence and then take a vote? Or, given the well-known ways that (...) evidence exchange can go wrong, e.g., by exacerbating pre-existing biases, compromising the independence of individual judgments, etc., should the group simply take a vote without deliberating at all? While this question has multiple dimensions to it—including ethical and political dimensions—we approach the question through an epistemological lens. In particular, we investigate to what extent it is epistemically advantageous and disadvantageous that groups whose members disagree over some issue use deliberation in comparison to voting as a way to reach collective agreements. Extant approaches in the literature to this ‘deliberation versus voting’ comparison typically assume there is some univocal answer as to which group strategy is best, epistemically. We think this assumption is mistaken. We approach the deliberation versus voting question from a pluralist perspective, in that we hold that a group’s collective endeavor to solve an internal dispute can be aimed at different, albeit not necessarily incompatible, epistemic goals, namely the goals of truth, evidence, understanding, and epistemic justice. Different answers to our guiding question, we show, correspond with different epistemic goals. We conclude by exploring several ways to mitigate the potential epistemic disadvantages of solving intragroup disagreement by means of deliberation in relation to each epistemic goal. (shrink)

RESUMEN El artículo ingresa en la ontología del acontecer y recorre cuatro momentos. En primer lugar, distingue la visión del mundo en general, propia de la llamada “metafísica” de la visión del ser como acontecer, y busca un diálogo entre la perspectiva del ser en la metafísica y ontología de Hans-Georg Gadamer. En segundo lugar, analiza la estructura del acontecer o el modo como se despliega el movimiento del sentido, para determinar la lógica de la pregunta como estructura del acontecer. (...) En tercer lugar, entabla un diálogo entre la idea de acontecer y la categoría de finitud, para evidenciar que, cuando se piensa en una ontología del acontecer, esta remite a la determinación de la finitud. Y, finalmente, plantea algunas líneas de desarrollo para profundizar en esta investigación. ABSTRACT The articles discusses the ontology of the event and covers four moments. First, it identifies the general worldview typical of the “metaphysics” of being as event, and seeks to establish a dialogue between the perspective of being in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s metaphysics and his ontology. Secondly, it analyzes the structure of the event or the way in which the movement of meaning unfolds, in order to determine the logic of the question as structure of the event. Third, through a dialogue between the idea of event and the category of finitude, the article shows that thinking the ontology of the event leads to the determination of finitude. Finally, the article suggests a few lines of inquiry for further in-depth research of this topic. (shrink)

El artículo ingresa en la ontología del acontecer y recorre cuatro momentos. En primer lugar, distingue la visión del mundo en general, propia de la llamada “metafísica” de la visión del ser como acontecer, y busca un diálogo entre la perspectiva del ser en la metafísica y ontología de Hans-Georg Gadamer. En segundo lugar, analiza la estructura del acontecer o el modo como se despliega el movimiento del sentido, para determinar la lógica de la pregunta como estructura del acontecer. En (...) tercer lugar, entabla un diálogo entre la idea de acontecer y la categoría de finitud, para evidenciar que, cuando se piensa en una ontología del acontecer, esta remite a la determinaciónde la finitud. Y, finalmente, plantea algunas líneas de desarrollo para profundizar en esta investigación. (shrink)

The book will prove an invaluable source for philosophers and philosophy students, as well as for scholars from other disciplines (e.g., history, political science, sociology, diversity studies, and gender and race studies) to begin understanding the dynamic relationship in thinking between the two Americas. In addition to documenting the results of a new and thriving area of research, it can also function as a primer to direct and provoke further inquiry. -/- Its essays, from North American, Spanish, and Latin American (...) scholars, fill a void in the humanities and introduce a number of Hispanic pragmatists who have not been included in standard pragmatist texts. (shrink)

Nosso objetivo nesse artigo é discutir o argumento do senso comum contra o ceticismo acerca do mundo externo. Apresentaremos o argumento que faz uso de hipóteses céticas e que conclui pela impossibilidade do conhecimento sobre o mundo externo. A seguir apresentaremos o senso comum segundo o filósofo G. E, Moore. Moore defende que o senso comum é capaz de refutar o ceticismo e propõe uma Prova do Mundo Externo, mas terá que livrar sua teoria de duas acusações principais: sua teoria (...) é dogmática e sua prova sofre de petição de princípio. Avaliaremos, ao final, se o senso comum é, de fato, capaz de fazer o enfrentamento teórico com o cético. Palavras Chave : Epistemologia, Ceticismo, Senso Comum. (shrink)

In this essay I pay homage to one of the most important but neglected philosophers of liberation in Latin America, Luis Villoro, by considering what possible lessons we can learn from his philosophy about how to approach injustices in the Americas. Villoro was sympathetic to liberatory-leftist philosophies but he became concerned with the direction they took once they grew into philosophical movements centered on shared beliefs or on totalizing theories that presume global explanatory power. These movements became vulnerable to extremes (...) or vices that undermine their liberatory promise. I examine some of these worrying tendencies among that body of literature roughly described as “decolonial thought” (e.g., Enrique Dussel, Walter Mignolo). After a concise presentation of Villoro and the decolonial turn, I consider four dangers that this new liberatory-leftist movement faces and why Villoro should be a significant voice as the decoloniality debate moves forward. (shrink)

E n e s t e e n s a y o a r g u me n t o q u e l ametafilosofía de los pragmatistas es lacontribución más importante de estosf i l ós of os a l a hi s t or i a de l a f i l os of í ay es t ambi én l o que l os di st i ngue deot ros f i l ósof os. Los f i (...) l ósof os cl ási cosamericanos y losfilósofos pragmatistas hispanos, Ortegay Gasset y Risieri Frondizi, propusieronque l a f i l osof í a debe de part i r desdel a experi enci a, es deci r, un punt o departida práctico. Despues de explicar quésignifica sostener que la experiencia es elpunto de partida, examino las razonesque tienen estos filósofos para sostenerque la experiencia es el punto de partidaapropiado si se quiere que la filosofía seaempírica y relevante. In this paper the metaphilosophy of pragmatists is the most important contribution of these philosophers to the history of philosophyand is also what distinguishes them fromother philosophers. The classic Americanphilosophers and the Hispanic philosophers, Ortega yGasset and Risieri Frondizi, proposed thatphilosophy must start from experience.After explaining what it means to takeexperience as the starting point, I examinethe reasons that pragmatists philosophershave for holding the view that experienceshould be the starting point if philosophyis to be empirical and relevant. (shrink)